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1 
Introduction: Participatory Requirements and Rights 
 
‘In England, the defendant acts no kind of part: his hat stuck on a pole 
might without inconvenience be his substitute at the trial.’1  
 
The above statement was made by a French observer of the English criminal trial in the early 
nineteenth century. It reflects a long-standing perception that, within England and Wales, 
those accused of criminal wrongdoing are free to sit back and wait for the state to prove their 
guilt. Accordingly, the defendant need not play an active role in pre-trial proceedings, nor is 
he obliged to speak on his own behalf at trial. However, times have changed. A hat stand is 
no longer an accurate descriptor of the defendant in court, nor is it a convincing symbol of his 
or her role during criminal investigations and pre-trial proceedings. Active and cooperative 
defendants can provide information which can assist the police and prosecution in building 
and presenting a case. Active and cooperative defendants can also prevent unnecessary delay 
by, for example, ensuring early identification of the issues in the case. Over the past two 
decades in particular, there has been an increase in demand from government and some 
criminal justice professionals for accused persons to actively participate throughout the 
criminal process. The increase in demand for participation has accompanied an increase in 
demand for convictions and efficiency in criminal proceedings.  
 
The increase in demand for participation has resulted in the imposition of requirements on 
defendants to actively participate, backed by penalties for non-cooperation. These 
requirements derive from legislation and have been given effect by the courts. The purpose of 
this book is to critically examine the participatory role of the defendant during the pre-trial 
and trial stages of the criminal process, from charge to verdict,2 and to assess the impact 
which requiring active participation has had on the nature of criminal procedure. The position 
taken is that it is wrong to require defendants to actively participate in proceedings against 
themselves. This argument is based on a broad approach to fair trial rights and a normative 
position, or theory, which holds that the criminal process should operate as a mechanism for 
                                                            
1 C Cottu, On the Administration of Criminal Justice in England; and the Spirit of the English Government 
(anon tr, London, Richard Stevens, 1822) 105.  
2 The term ‘charge’ is used in the autonomous sense, as provided for by Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which includes pending or anticipated criminal proceedings.  See, for 
example, Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439 [42], where the term ‘charge’ is said to be ‘very wide in 
scope’.  
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calling the state to account for its accusations and request for official condemnation and 
punishment of the accused. When fair trial rights are interpreted broadly, as they ought to be, 
they allow defendants to take a passive role, while challenging the state and holding it to 
account for its accusations of criminal wrongdoing. Moreover, if defendants are to be treated 
as free and dignified citizens of a liberal democracy, as they ought to be, they must be at 
liberty to choose whether or not to actively participate in criminal proceedings. This 
normative theory of the criminal process not only provides a basis for the argument against 
requiring active participation, but also provides a framework, or yardstick, from which to 
approach and examine wider developments in criminal procedure and the law of evidence.  
 
Before outlining the participatory requirements at issue, and further explaining the normative 
position, a distinction must be made between active and passive participation. The focus of 
this book is active participation. The defendant is an active participant when he is actively 
involved in the criminal process, as an individual, through means such as answering 
questions beyond statements of ‘no comment’,3 providing material evidence, and testifying in 
court. Active participation involves mental effort or voluntary physical movement on the part 
of the defendant, which results in the production of information. Passive participation, on the 
other hand, requires no direct action on the part of the defendant, beyond submission. Arrest, 
searches, detention in police custody, being subjected to police questioning without 
answering, and being presented to and being present in court, are all forms of passive 
participation in the criminal process. As Leng notes, they are events ‘which happen to the 
suspect rather than requiring action by her.’4   
 
The focus of this book is on active participation rather than passive participation because the 
increase in requirements to actively participate is relatively recent and far-reaching. It has, 
therefore, become necessary to consider the consequences of the defendant’s new 
participatory role. Requirements of active participation have implications for the 
enforceability of fair trial rights, even when they are interpreted narrowly.5 These rights can 
                                                            
3 In practice, where an accused responds to police questioning by stating ‘no comment’, the response is treated 
in the same way as silence, and adverse inferences may be drawn against the accused under the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA 1994). 
4 R Leng, ‘The Right to Silence Reformed: A Re-appraisal of the Royal Commission’s Influence’ (2001) 6 
Journal of Civil Liberties 107, 128. 
5 See, for example, the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, which has been interpreted narrowly 
and has also been set aside in pursuit of the public interest. See ch 5. See also Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 
(PC); O’Halloran and Francis v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 21. 
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provide the defendant with a choice of whether or not to cooperate in the criminal process. 
Depriving the defendant of that choice has significant implications for the nature of criminal 
procedure. England and Wales can no longer be characterised as ‘adversarial’ in any strict 
sense of the term, such as Mirjan Damaska’s core meaning of it: ‘a contest or a dispute 
[which] unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries before a relatively passive decision 
maker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict.’6 While it is natural for systems to transform 
over time, it is of concern that there has been a departure from legal norms and rights which 
became workable as part of an adversarial system.7  
 
1.1 Participatory requirements  
In order to demonstrate the way in which an increase in demand for participation has 
transformed the role of the defendant and the nature of criminal procedure, three areas of the 
law of evidence and criminal procedure are examined in chapters 5 through 7. These are: the 
privilege against self-incrimination; the right to silence; and pre-trial disclosure. As a result of 
an increasingly restrictive notion of the privilege against self-incrimination, and legislative 
reforms to the law concerning the right to silence and disclosure, defendants can be required 
to participate.  It is appropriate to use the term ‘required’ because the defendant is subject to 
compulsion to participate. The compulsion stems from the penalties attached to non-
cooperation.  
 
In relation to the privilege against self-incrimination, defendants can face a direct compulsion 
to provide self-incriminating information, where non-compliance is a criminal offence, 
provided for by statute.8 It is not a criminal offence or contempt of court to remain silent or 
refuse to disclose details of one’s case before trial. Nonetheless, defendants are subject to 
indirect compulsion to participate; a failure to answer police questions, give evidence in 
court, or comply with disclosure obligations can result in an adverse inference being drawn 
against the defendant.9 The inference may be one of guilt and can contribute to a conviction. 
The defendant is, thus, subject to a penalty because a failure to participate can result in a 
                                                            
6 M Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1986) 3.  
7 While the shift away from adversarialism is a key theme of this book, this is not a historical study. However, 
aspects of the development of adversarialism and participatory rights are examined in ch 4.2. See also JM 
Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986); JH Langbein, The 
Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). 
8 See, for example, Road Traffic Act 1988, s 172, discussed in ch 5.3.3. 
9 As provided for by the CJPOA 1994, ss 34-37, and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s 11. 
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detriment that would not otherwise be endured. That detriment is provided for by law and 
associates non-participation with guilt. To penalise the defendant is to treat him as though he 
had done something wrong. By subjecting defendants to compulsion to actively participate, 
and then using the law to put them in a disadvantaged position if they do not comply, the 
message that is conveyed by the practices examined in this book is that it is wrong for 
defendants not to participate.   
 
The privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence, and disclosure have been 
selected for analysis on the basis that these three areas of law provide the clearest and most 
striking examples of requirements to actively participate. In addition, these areas of law have 
long been the subject of controversy and debate. This book provides an important opportunity 
to not only consider the impact of reform on the defendant, but also the development and 
rationales of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence, and pre-trial 
disclosure.  
 
There are, however, a number of other practices and rules through which defendants can be 
subject to compulsion to participate and penalised for non-compliance. The penalties include 
the loss of a sentence discount for those who do not plead guilty but are found guilty 
following a contested trial, as discussed in chapter 3. In addition to a loss of sentence 
discount, a mandatory Criminal Courts Charge was introduced in 2015.10 While the financial 
charge was imposed on all convicted adults, those who were found guilty following a 
contested trial faced a higher fixed-sum charge than those who pleaded guilty. The Criminal 
Courts Charge was met with heavy criticism from criminal justice professionals, in part due 
to the increased pressure on the innocent to plead guilty.11 It has since been abolished.12  
 
Ongoing concern over the pressure faced by defendants to plead guilty may, at times, 
overshadow the changing role of the defendant in contested cases. However, while the vast 
majority of criminal cases end in a guilty plea, the prospect of a trial shapes the pre-trial 
stages of the criminal process, and there continue to be a significant number of contested 
                                                            
10 The Criminal Courts Charge was introduced by Statutory Instrument in April 2015, just before Parliament 
was dissolved, allowing little or no opportunity for parliamentary debate. Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
(Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015/796; Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, ss 21A-21F.  
11 For a summary of the criticism and concerns, see House of Commons Justice Committee, Criminal Courts 
Charge Second Report of Session 2015-16 HC586 (London, The Stationery Office, 2015)  
12 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) (Amendment) Regulations 2015/1970. 
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trials in England and Wales each year.13 Most of the participatory requirements explored in 
this study are imposed on the defendant before the trial, while the penalty for non-
cooperation is implemented during, or after, the trial stage of the criminal process.  
 
The defendant can also be penalised through sanctions for failure to comply with case 
management directions under the Criminal Procedure Rules, as examined in chapters 3 and 7. 
In addition, where a reverse burden of proof is imposed on the defence at trial, it will often be 
necessary for the defendant to participate in order to discharge the burden. A failure to 
discharge the burden will result in the conviction of the defendant. Consideration is given to 
reverse burdens of proof as a participatory requirement in the final chapter. Many other 
situations in which non-participation can result in a detriment that would not otherwise be 
endured concern the passive participation of the accused, rather than his active participation. 
For example, a refusal to submit to a police stop and search could result in arrest, and a 
refusal to be subjected to police questioning could result in a longer period of detention. 
However, for the reasons outlined above, this study is concerned only with requirements to 
actively participate during the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process.  
 
By omitting to consider coerced passive participation, it is by no means assumed that such 
coercion is unobjectionable.14 For example, being subjected to a compulsory search, having 
bodily samples forcibly taken, or being detained in police custody or on remand prior to trial 
can amount to intrusions of the right to privacy, the right to be free from inhuman and 
degrading treatment,15 and the right to liberty. These forms of passive participation must be 
regulated, and they require justification, such as being necessary in the interests of crime 
prevention or public safety.16 Once the consequences of coerced active participation have 
been examined, and the case against requiring active participation has been established, a 
                                                            
13 In 2014, there were 71,969 effective trials and 28,092 ineffective trials in the magistrates’ courts of England 
and Wales. In the same year, 27,953 defendants were dealt with in the Crown Court following a plea of not-
guilty. See Ministry of Justice, Criminal Court Statistics: April-June 2015 (Main Tables) (Ministry of Justice, 
September 2015) Tables M2 and C5. 
14 Passive participation is coerced in so far as the accused has no choice but to participate and can be physically 
compelled to do so.  
15 See, for example, Jalloh v Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 32, in which the forcible administration of emetics in 
order to obtain evidence of a drugs offence was contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.  
16 See, for example, Article 8(2) of the ECHR, which provides that the right to respect for private and family life 
can be interfered with by a public authority in accordance with the law and where necessary in a democratic 
society ‘in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.’ 
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standard can be identified, and perhaps later applied, to assess whether the various forms of 
coerced passive participation are justifiable.   
 
It should be noted that, along with the defendant as an individual, the defence as a party has 
faced an increase in expectations of participation.17 The defence party consists of the 
defendant as well as his legal representatives. The defence party actively participates when it 
goes beyond simply putting the prosecution to proof by, for example, providing information 
about the defence case ahead of trial, raising a positive defence, and adducing evidence in 
support of that defence at trial. As will be shown, defence representatives can face penalties 
for non-compliance with participatory requirements, and can be placed in the difficult 
position of having to choose between their conflicting duties to the defendant and to the 
court. However, the main focus is the participatory requirements placed on the defendant as 
an individual, as the existence of the defence party should enable the defendant to take a 
passive role in the criminal process, without sacrificing the opportunity to test the 
prosecution’s case.  
 
1.2 Rights and participation 
While the defendant’s participation may prove useful to the pursuit of efficient fact-finding, it 
should be a choice and not a requirement. This position can be justified on the basis that the 
coerced participation of the accused undermines the right to put the prosecution to proof and 
to defend oneself. The defendant’s right to see that the prosecution can prove the case against 
him is expressed through the presumption of innocence. As part of the right to a fair trial, the 
defendant must be presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence is an ancient and 
fundamental principle.18 Its value lies in its role as a procedural protection against wrongful 
conviction, and also in the effect it gives to a claim to fair treatment by the state.19  
                                                            
17 See, for example, pt 3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, discussed in chs 3 and 7. 
18 The presumption of innocence has been traced back to Roman times. It now has a place in every international 
human rights document, including Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
On the history of the presumption, see A Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights 
Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 1-8. See also Coffin v United States, 156 US 432 (1895). 
19 On the presumption of innocence, see generally A Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ 
(2006) 10 E & P 241; V Tadros, ‘Rethinking the Presumption of Innocence’ (2007) 1 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 193; A Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2010); HL Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter 
(eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2012); P Roberts, ‘Loss of Innocence in Common Law Presumptions’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
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The presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proving the 
defendant’s guilt at the criminal trial. In other words, it is a reflection of the prosecution’s 
burden of proof. It ordinarily requires the prosecution to both prove that the defendant 
committed the offence for which he has been charged and to disprove any defence which is 
advanced by him or on his behalf.20 This conception of the presumption of innocence was 
endorsed by Viscount Sankey LC in Woolmington v DPP, when the duty of the prosecution 
to prove the defendant’s guilt was declared a ‘golden thread’ of the English criminal law.21  
However, placing the burden of proof on the prosecution at trial does not in itself reveal 
much about the role which the defendant should play throughout the criminal process. Nor 
does it reveal much about how and where the prosecution can ascertain the evidence on 
which it relies to prove guilt. 
 
On a broader scale, the presumption of innocence operates throughout the criminal process, 
as a direction to officials to treat the accused as if he were innocent, until guilt is proved. This 
is not to say that state officials must believe that the accused is in fact innocent. However, the 
state has a duty to recognise the defendant’s legal status of innocence at all stages prior to 
conviction and after acquittal.22 These two approaches to the presumption have been explored 
by Ho as a common law rule on the one hand, and a human right on the other.23 These, in 
part, correspond to what Ashworth has labelled the ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ concepts of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Philosophy 317; H Stewart, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 407; 
V Tadros, ‘The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 449. 
20 There are, however, many instances in which the burden is reversed, and the defence is required to prove or 
disprove an issue at the trial. See ch 8.1. On reverse burdens of proof generally, see A Ashworth and M Blake, 
‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law’ [1996] Crim LR 306; P Roberts, ‘The Presumption of 
Innocence Brought Home? Kebilene Deconstructed’ (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 41; V Tadros and S 
Tierney, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act’ (2004) 67 MLR 402; I Dennis, ‘Reverse 
Onuses and the Presumption of Innocence: In Search of Principle’ [2005] Crim LR 901; D Hamer, ‘The 
Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 142; A 
Stumer, The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2010); F Picinali, ‘Innocence and Burdens of Proof in English Criminal Law’ (2014) 13 Law, Probability & 
Risk 243. 
21 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL) 481. 
22 European human rights law supports a wide approach to the presumption of innocence in so far as Article 6 of 
the ECHR applies to both the pre-trial and trial stages of the criminal process. For example, the presumption of 
innocence should be taken into consideration when determining whether to grant bail or remand the defendant in 
custody pending trial. See Caballero v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 643. The European Court of Human Rights has also 
recognised what Trechsel identifies as a ‘reputation-related’ aspect of the presumption; it should protect the 
accused from any official insinuation that he is guilty, and can be infringed by public figures as well as by 
judges and courts. See S Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005) 164; Allenet de Ribemont v France (1995) 20 EHRR 557. 
23 HL Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter (eds), Criminal 
Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2012). 
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presumption of innocence.24 Precisely what a wide conception of the presumption should 
entail is contestable, and a comprehensive exploration of the meaning, nature and 
implications of the presumption of innocence is outside of the scope of this work. However, a 
wide conception places more restrictions on what can be required of the defendant than the 
narrow conception, which simply reflects the prosecution’s burden of proof at trial. Under a 
wide conception, the presumption can, and arguably should, act as a restraint on the various 
compulsory measures that may be taken against suspects in the period before trial.25 These 
measures include requirements to cooperate with the police and prosecution by answering 
questions or providing evidence. To demand that the accused account for the allegations 
made against them, or provide information which may assist in their prosecution, is not to 
treat them as innocent.  
 
The defendant’s right to have the case against him proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
whether viewed from a narrow trial-centred approach or from a wider human rights 
perspective, underpins the case against requiring active defendant participation and 
penalising non-cooperation. When the emphasis is on the defendant’s participation, the 
presumption of innocence becomes much less pronounced, as the focus shifts from the 
prosecution to the defence. In many circumstances, to require the defendant to actively 
participate is to ease the prosecution’s burden of proof and is also contrary to treating him as 
if he were innocent. This occurs where, for example, the defendant’s failure to participate can 
be used by the prosecution as evidence of guilt, notwithstanding that the correlation between 
non-participation and guilt may be extremely tenuous.26 This book advocates a wide 
interpretation of the presumption of innocence which is both a reflection of the prosecution’s 
burden of proof at the trial and a direction to officials to treat the defendant as if he were 
innocent, until guilt is proved. To treat the defendant as innocent should mean that he be 
under no obligation to actively assist in the discharge of the state’s obligation to prove guilt, 
either expressly or in consequence of a procedural requirement.  
 
Requiring defendant participation and penalising non-cooperation also raises issues of 
compatibility with other fair trial rights. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, sets out the minimum conditions of fairness. 
                                                            
24 A Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E & P 241. 
25 ibid 243.  
26 See the discussion on inferences from silence and non-disclosure in chs 6 and 7. 
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It has been influential in many cases in which the imposition of penalties for non-cooperation 
have been challenged. In addition to the presumption of innocence,27 Article 6 provides for 
the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence.28 These rights are discussed in 
detail in chapters 5 and 6, so it is sufficient to mention here that they provide the defendant 
with specific rights not to actively participate in the criminal process. Consequently, requiring 
defendant participation, and penalising non-compliance, undermines the rights which 
guarantee defendants a fair trial, and, by extension, undermines the legitimacy of the criminal 
process as a whole. As contended in the following chapter, it is adherence to principles of 
fairness and respect for rights which legitimises the process and the outcome of criminal 
cases.  
 
It will become clear throughout the following chapters that the rationale, definition and scope 
of the various rights under consideration are debatable. The broad interpretation of fair trial 
rights which is promoted in this book is sometimes contrary to the narrow way in which the 
rights have been interpreted and applied by the courts. As mentioned above, a broad 
interpretation of fair trial rights is linked to a normative theory of the criminal process as a 
mechanism for calling the state to account. The basis for this theory is explained in the 
following section. It is further developed and applied throughout the book. 
 
1.3 A theory of the criminal process 
Once the state has exercised the power to accuse and charge an individual for a criminal 
offence, it is for the state to prove those accusations. As previously argued, the criminal 
process should be conceived of as a process of calling the state to account for the accusations 
which it has brought against the individual, before that individual can be subjected to official 
condemnation or punishment.29 The state can account for the accusations by proving the guilt 
of the accused, using its police and prosecuting agencies. Guilt can be proved by way of the 
                                                            
27 ECHR, Article 6(2). 
28 Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
29 The theory of calling the state to account is inspired by Hock Lai Ho’s argument that a central purpose of the 
adversarial criminal trial is to hold the executive arm of government to account in its quest to enforce the 
criminal law. The language of calling, or holding, the state to account has been adopted and applied to pre-trial 
procedures as well as the trial. However, it is not assumed that Ho would subscribe to the substance or 
grounding of the theory set out in this book, or the absolutist position which is taken. See HL Ho, ‘Liberalism 
and the Criminal Trial’ [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87; HL Ho, ‘The Presumption of Innocence 
as a Human Right’ in P Roberts and J Hunter (eds), Criminal Evidence and Human Rights: Reimagining 
Common Law Procedural Traditions (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
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accused’s plea of guilty,30 or by way of a verdict of guilty following a contested trial, at 
which due respect is paid to the rights of the defendant. The state is accountable to the 
defendant, who must have an opportunity to understand and challenge the basis for the 
accusations against him. The state is also accountable to the wider community, as the 
individuals within the community are subject to state power and have an interest in the state 
acting within its powers.  
 
This theory of the criminal process takes an absolutist position as to the defendant’s role. The 
defendant should be under no requirement to actively participate by answering questions or 
providing information during the pre-trial and trial stages, not least because to do so may 
assist the state in accounting for its accusations. It is, therefore, appropriate to take an 
absolutist ‘no-assistance’ approach. The state should justify and account for the accusations 
of wrongdoing which it has brought against the defendant, without the defendant’s co-opted 
assistance.31  
 
The theory, and its absolutist approach, is grounded in political liberal theory and in the 
values of dignity, autonomy, and freedom. The importance of these values, in relation to the 
contemporary liberal state, can be traced back to the emphasis placed on individualism during 
the age of enlightenment, and to social contract theory. The meaning of dignity is often 
context specific, but at its core is a requirement that the intrinsic worth of every human being 
be recognised and respected.32 As part of our intrinsic worth, we have the authority to 
demand respect for our autonomy. To be treated with dignity thus includes being treated as an 
autonomous individual; as self-governing and able to make choices for oneself.33 Autonomy 
is freedom, and freedom, or liberty, is an inherent good. Kant, for example, conceived of 
freedom as an a priori principle on which the civil state is based; it is not afforded by the 
                                                            
30 A guilty plea does not necessarily mean that the defendant is in fact guilty. However, where the defendant has 
made a free and informed decision to plead guilty, he has forfeited the right to test the case against him at a trial. 
Conversely, if a guilty plea was coerced through, for example, the threat of a harsher sentence following 
conviction, the state cannot truly be said to have accounted for the accusations. On sentence reductions for 
guilty pleas, see ch 3.2.2. 
31 Assistance, in this context, refers only to assistance obtained through the active participation of the accused. 
32 C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655, 679. On the meaning and legal application of dignity, see also LR Barroso, ‘Here, There, 
and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse’ (2012) 35 Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 331. 
33 C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655, 659-660. Kant in particular has become closely affiliated with the idea of dignity as 
autonomy. See I Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
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state.34 Kant had a notable influence on Rawls. In the original position, as conceived by 
Rawls, citizens are free and equal rational persons, before the basic structures of society are 
determined.35 As inherently autonomous beings, we should be at liberty to conduct our 
affairs, and make our choices, free from external interference.  The conception of liberty 
advanced here is negative; we should be left to do as we would like to do, rather than our 
actions being controlled by an external source.36  
 
However, our liberty is restricted by the laws of the state in the interests of other values, 
particularly the interests of freedom itself. As Isaiah Berlin wrote, ‘the liberty of some must 
depend on the restraint of others.’37 In particular, the criminal law can prohibit us from 
conducting ourselves in a way that interferes with the liberty of other people. Certain 
behaviour may thus be criminalised in order to maximise liberty for everyone, and to protect 
individuals from encroachment on their freedom from other individuals.38 The normative 
theory of calling the state to account accepts this role of the criminal law; it does not advocate 
absolute freedom.39 There is, however, an inherent good in free behaviours, and freedom 
must not be interfered with lightly or without very good reason.  
 
The basis for allowing the law to restrict our freedom is the social contract, from which the 
state is brought into being. Social contract theorists differ in their conceptions of the social 
contract. In accordance with the theories of Locke and Rawls, the individual agrees to obey 
the laws of the state and, in so doing, sacrifices a portion of their freedom in order to preserve 
the greatest possible liberty overall. The individual should only need to sacrifice the smallest 
possible portion of liberty necessary to enjoy what remains in security and calm.40 Precisely 
what the smallest portion amounts to is open to debate. For the reasons expressed in the 
following paragraphs, it should not extend to the freedom to choose whether or not to actively 
participate in the criminal process. The criminal process is the process by which liability for a 
                                                            
34 I Kant, Political Writings (HS Reiss ed, HB Nisbet tr, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991) 74.  
35 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev edn (Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).  
36 On positive and negative liberty, see I Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in I Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969).  
37 ibid 124. 
38 C Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (R Bellamy ed, R Davies tr, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 10. 
39 In developing a theory of the criminal process, no attempt is made to adopt or create an overarching theory of 
substantive criminal law. The basis for allowing particular criminal laws to interfere with individual liberty falls 
outside of the scope of this work.  
40 C Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (R Bellamy ed, R Davies tr, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) 9-11. 
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criminal offence is determined. It is the state’s means of enforcing the criminal law through 
denunciation and punishment of those who are found to have breached it.  It is submitted here 
that, to best realise, within the criminal process, that we are free and dignified human beings, 
we must be at liberty to choose whether or not to actively participate.  
 
Freedom of choice is important in the criminal process because there is a structural imbalance 
between the state and those accused of breaching the criminal law, in terms of both power 
and resources. This imbalance is present throughout the process. The state has immense 
powers of investigation, prosecution, trial, and sentencing. In a liberal society, the state’s far-
reaching powers should be exercised according to certain standards that show respect for the 
dignity and autonomy of each individual.41 In terms of resources, the accused and the state 
are in divergent positions. Ordinarily, the accused, and the defence as a party, lack the 
independent investigatory and coercive powers of the prosecution party, and do not have 
access to the same type of information or technology, such as access to forensic services or 
the criminal records of witnesses. Of course, a disparity in resources will not always favour 
the state. Some defendants, such as major corporations or those involved in large scale 
organised crime, may have ample resources which could be used to fabricate a defence or 
cast doubt on the prosecution’s case.42 However, where a disparity favours the accused, it 
results from the initial decision as to the distribution of state resources to the prosecution 
authorities. As well as deciding how to distribute its resources, the state also chooses who to 
pursue for alleged criminal behaviour, and how to dispose of individuals once convicted.  
 
Following conviction, the state has the power and resources to interfere substantially with 
one’s liberty. It may exercise this power to remove liberty completely. Even in the absence of 
official punishment, the public condemnatory statement of blameworthiness can have 
damaging consequences through, for example, an inability to gain employment. As noted by 
Barkow, ‘the state poses no greater threat to individual liberty than when it proceeds in a 
                                                            
41 A Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E & P 241, 249. See also HL Ho, 
‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87. 
42 This forms an element of what Langbein refers to as the ‘wealth effect’ of the adversarial system. Adversary 
procedure bestows an advantage upon people who can afford to hire skilled counsel. Because most persons 
accused of serious crime are not wealthy, the wealth effect is considered to be a profound structural flaw in 
adversary criminal procedure. See JH Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 2. While the availability of state funded legal representation in many modern systems 
undermines this criticism of the adversarial system, the defendant’s wealth can affect certain aspects of the case, 
such as the ability to conduct investigations or commission expert witnesses.  
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criminal action.’43 Since liberty is an inherent good, the onus must be on the state to justify its 
accusations wherever it seeks to curtail the liberty of its citizens.44 As part of the social 
contract, individuals should be protected not only from the freedom-restricting conduct of 
other individuals, but also from the arbitrary use of state power, including punishment for 
breach of the criminal law where this is not justified.45 There is, thus, a need to create fairness 
within a system of imbalance. This requires that guilt is proved by the state, that the accused 
is treated fairly, and that the accused is protected from the potential for arbitrary and 
oppressive use of state power, as well as from the oppressive use of power itself.  
 
To achieve fairness within a system of imbalance, the procedures used to determine 
allegations of criminal conduct must be consistent with the freedom of the persons whose 
conduct is in issue.46  As is explained in chapter 4, the protections afforded to defendants by 
fair trial rights developed historically as a means of ensuring fairness within a structurally 
imbalanced system. Many fair trial rights give effect to the freedom of the accused in the 
criminal process. They afford the defendant the freedom to choose whether or not to actively 
participate. Freedom of choice is exhibited, for example, in the freedom to plead guilty or 
not, in the right to silence, in the privilege against self-incrimination and other participatory 
and non-participatory rights.47  
 
The freedom to choose whether or not to actively participate also gives effect to a further 
aspect of human dignity; recognition that the state exists for the sake of the individual human 
being, and not vice versa.48 In the context of the criminal process, this should mean that the 
process exists in order for the state to establish the guilt of the accused, and justify its 
findings, rather than the accused being required to establish his innocence or actively 
contribute to his own conviction. In accordance with Kantian principles, each individual must 
be treated as dignified and autonomous; as an end in themselves and not simply as a means to 
                                                            
43 RE Barkow, ‘Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law’ (2006) 58 Stanford Law Review 989, 995. 
44 HL Ho, ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87, 89. See also RL 
Lippke, ‘Justifying the Proof Structure of Criminal Trials’ (2013) 17 E & P 323. 
45 See J Jackson and S Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and 
Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 203. For a further assessment of the 
influence of social contract theory on the development of modern principles of criminal justice, see J Jackson 
and S Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law 
Traditions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) ch 1. 
46 H Stewart, ‘The Right to be Presumed Innocent’ (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 407, 408. 
47 HL Ho, ‘Liberalism and the Criminal Trial’ [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87, 99. 
48 C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655, 679. 
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an end.49 Thus, one should not be treated as an object from which the state can extract 
information for use in criminal proceedings, as is often a purpose of requiring the defendant 
to actively participate.  
 
The basic premise of the theory of the criminal process as a process of calling the state to 
account can be summarised as follows: Because we, as individuals, agree to abide by the 
criminal laws of the state which prohibit certain behaviours, and, in so doing, give up some of 
our freedom, the state should account for any allegation that we have breached those laws, 
before subjecting us to condemnation and punishment. The respect for our freedom, which is 
owed to us as individual citizens of society, and the maximum value which should be 
accorded to individual autonomy, mean that we should be at liberty to choose whether we 
actively respond to those allegations. The criminal process is itself a coercive process in 
which individuals may be required to passively participate by, for example, being searched, 
arrested or subjected to questioning. However, the principles of dignity, autonomy, and 
freedom, dictate that accused persons should, at least, be able to choose whether to actively 
participate in the criminal process, and how to conduct their defence.50 To be required by the 
state to actively participate is to unjustifiably destroy our freedom at a time when it warrants 
maximum protection.  
 
The theory has been developed within the cultural context of English criminal procedure, and 
primarily as a means of assessing a specific issue, namely the increase in requirements for the 
defendant to actively participate in the criminal process. A more ambitious project could seek 
to apply it to requirements of passive participation, and to assess the appropriate limits of 
state pressure on defendants to participate, short of penalising a failure to do so.51  It could 
also be possible to take the theoretical grounding further, and apply it outside of the realm of 
criminal procedure, to consider, for example, whether and how it can provide a basis for 
determining the legitimacy of the substantive criminal law. However, within this book, the 
theory is limited to providing a tool for analysing developments in particular areas of criminal 
procedure and the law of evidence, and to act as a normative yardstick against which such 
developments can be measured.  
                                                            
49 See I Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
50 J Jackson and S Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil 
Law Traditions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 103. 
51 This could include, for example, an analysis of the law in relation to obtaining confessions and consideration 
of the extent to which the police can, or should, pressure accused persons into answering questions. 
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Before moving on, it is worth noting the position of the complainant and the public in relation 
to the normative theory. Complainants of crime, witnesses, and the wider community will 
inevitably play an important role in the criminal process by reporting crimes and providing 
information. However, once the state, through the police and prosecuting agencies, initiates a 
criminal investigation or brings criminal charges against an individual, it becomes a matter 
between the state and the accused, not the complainant and the accused or the complainant 
and the state.52 Because crimes are conceived of as public wrongs, and because the state has 
the power to prosecute and punish those who commit criminal offences, it is appropriate to 
frame a theory of the criminal process around the state’s obligations in relation to establishing 
the guilt of the accused. Nonetheless, protecting the interests of complainants and other 
witnesses, and providing them with necessary support and information, has become a priority 
for criminal justice agencies.53 The increasing emphasis on the interests of complainants and 
witnesses raises interesting questions about whether they should play a more central role in 
the criminal process, and whether they should have procedural rights.54 The issue of the 
interests of complainants is revisited briefly in the following chapter, where it is argued that 
such interests do not provide a basis for requiring defendant participation. The issue, 
however, remains a matter which, for the most part, falls outside of the scope of this book.55  
 
                                                            
52 Individuals have a right to bring private prosecutions. However, the Crown Prosecution Service retains the 
power to take over such prosecutions and either continue them or stop them. See Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985, s 6. 
53 See, for example, Crown Prosecution Service, The Prosecutors’ Pledge 
<www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/prosecutor_pledge.html> accessed 1 April 2016; Ministry of Justice, 
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (London, The Stationery Office, 2015). The 2015 Code of Practice 
implements relevant provisions of the EU Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime. See also D Lawrence, P Neyroud and K Starmer, Recommendations 
on a Victims’ Law: Report for the Labour Party by the Victims’ Taskforce (The Labour Party, February 2015); 
Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, Meeting the Needs of Victims in the Criminal Justice System (CCJI, 2015). 
54 See, for example, the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme, launched in 2013, which grants complainants the 
right to request a review of any decision taken by the Crown Prosecution Service to not charge a suspect or to 
stop a prosecution. See Crown Prosecution Service, Victims’ Right to Review Scheme 
<www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/> accessed 1 April 2016. This scheme gives 
effect to the principles laid out in R v Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608, [2012] 1 Cr App R 10. See also K 
Starmer, ‘Finality in Criminal Justice: When Should the CPS Reopen a Case?’ [2012] Crim LR 526. 
55 See I Edwards, ‘An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision Making’ (2004) 
44 British Journal of Criminology 967; J Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2008); M Hall, ‘The Relationship Between Victim and Prosecutors: Defending Victims 
Rights?’ [2010] Crim LR 31; A Ashworth and M Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 51-55; K Starmer, ‘Human Rights and Victims: the Untold Story of 
the Human Rights Act’ [2014] European Human Rights Law Review 215; K Starmer, ‘Human Rights, Victims 
and the Prosecution of Crime in the 21st Century’ [2014] Crim LR 777. 
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The public play an important role within the English criminal process and within the process 
of calling the state to account. The public nature of the criminal trial helps to ensure that the 
state can account for the accusations made against the defendant, and that it does so in a 
legitimate manner.56 As noted above, the state is accountable not only to the defendant, but 
also to the wider community. Moreover, it is often members of the public, in the form of a 
jury or lay magistrate, that determine whether or not the state has accounted for the 
accusations made against the defendant. However, again, because the state takes 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal wrongs, and because the wider public possess 
little control over the decision to prosecute or the way in which a case is dealt with, the 
theory does not directly address the role of the public as participants in the criminal process.57  
 
1.4 Structure of the book 
Having introduced the subject matter of this book, and outlined the arguments against 
requiring active defendant participation, the following chapters will proceed to evaluate the 
role of the defendant as a participant in the criminal process and the implications of 
participatory requirements. Chapter 2 sets out the aims and values of the criminal process. It 
considers which aims must necessarily be emphasised in order to justify requiring defendant 
participation, and why the values of the criminal process should prevent the imposition of 
participatory requirements. Chapter 3 examines the way in which the participatory role of the 
defendant can shape the nature of criminal procedure, and how criminal procedure can be 
characterised according to the defendant’s role. Chapter 4 further develops the normative 
theory of calling the state to account by contrasting it with an alternative communicative 
theory of the criminal trial. Chapter 4 also examines the historical development of defence 
rights which can facilitate a lack of participation, and assesses the defendant’s current 
position as a participant in the English criminal process, particularly at trial.  
 
                                                            
56 See the discussion on public trials in ch 4.1. 
57 Other commentators assign a greater participatory role to the public. For example, Hoyano has developed a 
conception of a fair trial which accommodates a quadrangulation between defendant, the alleged victim, other 
witnesses, and the public interest, all of whom are participants and can lay claim to the right to a fair trial. L 
Hoyano, ‘What is Balanced in the Scales of Justice? In Search of the Essence of the Right to a Fair Trial’ [2014] 
Crim LR 4, 25. See also R Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (Hants, Ashgate Publishing, 2005). 
Moreover, alternative methods of criminal justice, such as restorative justice, entail much greater involvement of 
the victim and the community. However, in order to be successful, restorative justice requires admission of guilt 
on the part of the accused as well as the accused’s willingness to be actively involved in the process. On the role 
of state, community, and victim in restorative justice, see A Ashworth, ‘Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative 
Justice’ (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 578. 
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Chapters 5 through 7 present three specific examples of the way in which defendants can be 
required to actively participate and penalised for not doing so. Chapter 5 critically evaluates 
how the modern understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination has been limited 
through requirements of defendant participation. Reliance on the privilege can now, in some 
circumstances, lead to the direct penalty of criminal prosecution for non-cooperation. In 
chapter 6, the law in relation to the right to silence is considered. The main point of interest is 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the case law surrounding it, which 
controversially allow the fact-finder to draw inferences of guilt from a defendant’s silence. 
Chapter 7 examines the pre-trial disclosure obligations placed on the defendant by the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, and the provisions for drawing adverse 
inferences where the defendant fails to comply with the obligations. Chapter 7 also considers 
the procedural implications of the case management provisions in the Criminal Procedure 
Rules, which augment the statutory disclosure provisions. The final chapter presents a means 
of characterising English criminal procedure in the light of the current participatory role of 
the defendant, and considers the future of the defendant as a participant in the criminal 
process.  
  
